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SECTION 304, TAFT-HARTLEY ACT: VALIDITY OF
RESTRICTIONS ON UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY
FOLLOWING several attempts by both AFL and CIO unions to challenge the
validity of Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act,1 the Department of Justice
recently has instituted separate prosecutions against the CIO and its presi-
dent, Philip Murray, for publishing and circulating newspapers commenting
on Congressional and Presidential candidates; and against Local 481 of the
AFL Painters' Union for advertising political opinion in the press and over
the radio.2 Sustaining a motion to dismiss the indictment of the CIO and its
president, the District Court for the District of Columbia has ruled that Sec-
tion 304, insofar as it prohibits political "expenditures" by labor organizations,
contravenes the First Amendment.3
The Section under which indictments were returned imposes criminal pen-
alties on corporations as well as labor organizations making either "expendi-
tures" or "contributions" in connection with federal elections.4 This discus-
1. 61 STAT. 159, 2 U.S.C.A. App. § 251 (Supp. 1947) (hereinafter cited as § 304),
amending, 43 STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 251 (1940) (Corrupt Practices Act of 1925).
2. Soon after passage of §304, the CIO issued a "1947 Voting Guide" for members
and endorsed a candidate in a Maryland special election in the CIO Nws and elsewhere.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 5. See statement by Philip Murray, President of the
CIO in CIO News, July 14, 1947, p. 1. For indications of increased CIO-PAC political
activity accentuating voluntary contributions, see N.Y. Times, July 11, 1947, p. 3, col. 2.
The Connecticut Federation of Labor also made early attempts to provoke the Justice
Department into action with publicized violations. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1947, p.
11, col. 2.
The Department of Justice initiated action on February 11, 1948, eight months
after the passage of the Act. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1948, p. 1, col. 5. Attorney Gen-
eral Clark invited Congress to join the Department of Justice in the prosecution, asking
the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations to name a lawyer who would par-
ticipate in the Government's case. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 26, 1948, p. 1, col. 4. The
Department of Justice has occasionally in the past invited Congressional Counsel to as-
sist in the enforcement of a controversial statute. In this instance, however, the Com-
mittee declined to participate. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1, col. 7. For
indictment of the CIO, see N.Y. Times, supra; for the indictment of the AFL Painter's
Union, see the Hartford Courant, Feb. 19, 1948, p. 1, col. 4.
3. United States v. Murray, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1948, p. 24, col. 1, cerL. granted
N.Y. Times, March 30, 1948, p. 24, col. 2.
4. Section 304 reads in part, "It is unlawful . . .for any corporation whatever, or
any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representa-
tive in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select can-
didates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or
other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every cor-
poration or labor organization which makes any contribution or expenditure in violation
of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any
corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or ex-
penditure by the corporation or labor organization ...in violation of this section shall
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sion, however, is confined to a constitutional evaluation of Section 304 as it
applies to labor organizations5 since it is this aspect which currently occupies
the attention of the courts.
SCOPE oF SECTiON 304
Passed with little debate," Section 304 ostensibly carries forward a program
of "corrupt practices" legislation7 instituted half a century ago. Since 1906,
Congress has, with minimal success, attempted to exercise some control over
corporate and individual political contributions and over political expenditures
by national committees and candidates.8 Not until 1943, however, was Con-
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."
Neither § 304 nor cognate legislation restricts political e'penditures unrelated to
elections. Such expenditures are regulated to some extent by the Federal Lobbying
Act, 41 STAT. 68, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1940) ; See Comment, Improving the Legislative Proc-
ess: Federal Regulation of Lobbying, 56 YALE L. J. 304 (1947).
5. This delimitation necessarily raises the issue of separability. But if, on the one
hand, the Act were held constitutional as it applies to labor unions, it seems unlikely that
any court would declare it unconstitutional as it applies to corporations. Cf. Anniston
Mig. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 351-2 (1936). If, on the other hand, the Act were held
unconstitutional vis-a-vis labor, it would seem to be tampering with congressional intent
to suppose that it might be allowed to remain on the books as an integrated enactment
directed solely at corporations.
6. Neither the House Labor Committee nor the Senate Labor and Education Com-
mittee, which heard testimony on bills which subsequently became the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, heard testimony on § 304. It was scarcely debated in the House,
where it originated, and was debated but part of one day, June 5, 1947, in the Senate. See
93 CONG. REc. 6436-6441 (1947).
7. The history of "corrupt practices" legislation is a well told tale. Consult gen-
erally, LoGAN, THE AmmcAN POLITICAL SCENE 170 (1936); OvEAcnE% Pnnsm=Tm' L
CAWAIGN FUNS (1946); POLLOCK, M6ONEY AND POLITICS AIrnOAD (1932); PoLLocK,
PARTY CAmpAiGN FUNDS (1926); SAiT, Am mcAN PARTIES AND ELEcnros (1939);
SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CoRRuPT-PRAcrcEs LEGISLATON (1928).
Textbooks on American political science often contain useful summaries of material
on "corrupt practices" legislation. See, e.g., KEY, PoLmicS, PAnnE's A=, PrEssur
GRours (1942), esp. c. 15; MfNIEAM AND GosuEu, Tn- A maucAw PARTY STEsz
(1946), esp. c. 16; ODnman AND HELms, Am tnICA PoLIcs (1938), esp. c. 19. See
also Pollock, Campaign Funds in 1928, 23 Am. Po. Scr. ,Ev. 47 (1929).
8. The 1906 legislation prohibited corporations from making "money" contributions
in connection with federal elections, 34 STAT. 864 (1907), 35 STAT. 1103 (1909), in order
to free party policy from corporate influence. Prior to its enactment, banks, insurance
companies, manufacturers and public utility companies were regular contributors, on a
notably non-partisan basis, either to the stronger party, or to both parties. See OsTno-
GORSxr, DEMOCmACY°AND THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 180 (1922); CnLY,
MARCUS ALONZO HANNA 325 (1912); cf. EB nLING, CONGRESSIONAL I.,vESA'rxOn 262
(1928). The validity of the ban on corporation contributions was sustained in the one
successful prosecution brought thereunder, although the district court decision was not
appealed. United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n., 239 Fed. 163 (V.D. Pa.
1916). The statute did not, however, prevent corporate political assistance in the form
of advertising expenditures. See OvuRAcKER, MONEY IN ELECtrIONS 335 (1932); Over-
acker, Campaign Funds in the Presidential Election of 1936, 31 Am. Po.. Scr. Ruv. 473,
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gressional action directed toward the regulation of labor union political ac-
tivity.9 By Section 9 of the temporary Smith-Connally Act,10 labor organiza-
479-80 (1937) ; Clark, Federal Regulation of Election Campaign Activities, 6 FED. B. 3.
5, 8 (1944). In addition, corporate officers and those who held controlling interests in
corporations made substantial individual contributions which spoke for corporate policies.
See ODEGAD AND HELmS, op. cit. supra note 7 at 658; OVzRACKER, MONEY IN ELECTrONS
158, 159, 336 (1932); Overacker, Campaign Funds is a Depression Year, 27 AM. PoL.
Sci. REv. 769 (1933); Overacker, Campaign Funds in 1936, 31 Am. PoL. Smt. Rzv. 473
(1937).
Legislative attention accordingly shifted to publicizing individual contributions, and
in 1911 the first federal pre-election publicity law was passed, requiring reports of con-
tributions to and expenditures by political committees, with limitations on expenditures
by individual candidates. 37 STAT. 25 (1911), 2 U.S.C. § 244 (1940), amending 36 STAY.
823 (1910). But the limitations proved meaningless and little publicity resulted. The
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §§241-256 (1940),
merely consolidated and modified previous legislation. See OvERAcKER, PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN FUNDS 22 (1946).
In 1940, Congress instituted a new program of prohibition in the second Hatch Act,
placing a $5000 per year limit on individual contributions to national committees and
candidates, and a $3,000,000 per year limit on expenditures by the committees themselves,
54 STAT. 767, 772, 18 U.S.C. § 61 (1940). Since only national committees were affected,
however, individual contributions were channeled easily into state and local political
agencies. See SEN. REP. No. 47, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 143-191 (1941); Overacker,
Campaign Finance in the Presidential Election of 1940, 35 Am. POL. Sci. Rzv. 701 (1941).
And even national committees could be financed in part by the aggregation of numerous
$5000 gifts from single families whose financial resources permitted substantial political
contributions, or by loans which were not repaid. See SEN. REP. No. 47, supra at 143-8;
KEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 664-5. The creation of a number of non-party organizations
in addition to the major national committees,-each of whose expenditures could total
$3,000,000,--made ineffective the limitation on expenditures. Such groups as "Associated
Willkie Clubs of America," "Democrats for Willkie," "We the People," "National Com-
mittee of Physicians for Willkie," and "National Committee of Independent Voters for
Roosevelt and Wallace" spent over $3,500,000. Moreover, each of these groups was
theoretically empowered to receive as much as $5000 from each contributor. See H.R.
REP. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 9-10 (1945), and Overacker, Presidential Cam-
paign Funds, 1944, 39 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 899, 905 (1945). As a result the total amount
spent in the 1940 election was $21,000,000, and in the 1944 election, $20,500,000, in contrast
to a previous total expenditure, in the halcyon 1928 election, of $16,500,000. S=i.
REP. No. 47, supra at 10, 11, and tables, 106-42 (1941) (1940 data) ; SEN. REP. No. 101,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1945) (1944 data). See Overacker, Presidential Campaign
Funds, 1944, 39 Am. POL. Sci. Rrv. 899, 916 (1945).
9. Several states have attempted to regulate contributions and expenditures by labor
unions, in most cases unsuccessfully. See ALA. CoDE, tit. 26, § 392 (Supp. 1943),
(forbidding political contributions by unions); CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 97, § 94 (20)
(Cum. Supp. 1946) (forbidding political expenditures by trade unions) ;'On. ComP. LAWS
ANN. § 102-909 (1940) (prohibiting the creation of "a fund in excess of the legitimate
requirements of the union.") ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 25, § 3225 (Purdon, 1941) (forbidding
contributions by unincorporated associations) ; TLx. Civ. STAT. ANN., tit. 83, art. 5154a,
§ 49 (Vernon, 1947) (forbidding contributions to candidates or political parties).
The Alabama limitation on political contributions by labor organizations, part of a
comprehensive labor regulation act, was struck down in Alabama State Federation of
Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810 (1944). The Alabama Supreme Court
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tions were barred from making "contributions" in connection with federal
elections."' But the statute had little practical effect. In deference to New-
berry v. United States,-' Congress had excluded primary elections from the
purview of the Act. Further, such groups as CIO-,PAC' 3 were construed not
to be "labor organizations."' 4 Finally, labor reorganized its method of political
held that a provision in the act prohibiting an organization of employers from making po-
litical contributions was invalid under § 45 of the Alabama Constitution since it bore
"no relation to the subject of the Act." Id. at 24, 18 So. 2d at 830. The court reasoned
further that since the "intent" of the legislature had been to equalize employers and em-
ployees, where employers were freed of the prohibition, employees must likewise be unre-
strained, in spite of the separability clause in the act. The Colorado prohibition fell in
AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944) (inseparable from unconstitutional re-
quirements of incorporation). The Oregon prohibition fell as inseparable from other un-
constitutional aspects of the statute, although the prohibition itself vas not specifically
voided, since not tested, in AFL v. Bain, 165 Ore. 183, 106 P.2d 544 (1940). A proposed
initiative law in Massachusetts which would have limited expenditures and contributions
by labor unions was struck down by the Massachusetts Supreme Court as violative of the
freedom of press provision of MASS. CoNsT., AiMEND. 48, The Initiative, I, § 2. Bowe v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946). The Te-as pro-
hibition was upheld, however, in AFL v. Mann, 188 S.Wr2d 276, 283 (Tc. Civ. App.
1945) on the basis that Congress had passed similar legislation in the Smith-Connally Act.
Since the law dealt only with contributions, the court felt that the right of the union to
educate or inform its members as to the merits or demerits of candidates or political par-
ties was not abridged.
For discussion of state legislation see Note, State Regulation of Labor Urions,
55 YATs L. J. 440 (1946); Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor 1941-1945,
58 HARv. L. REv. 1018, 1061 (1945) ; Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go to Wlar-On
Labor Unions, 29 IowA L. REv. 148 (1944) ; Villard, Wfhy Unions Must be Rcgulatcd, 58
A=L. MERcua 667 (1944) ; Milner and Brissenden, Union Regulation by the States, 103
Naw REPuumiac 790 (1943) ; Taper, Dixie Drive on Labor, 154 NATio.z 569 (1942) ; Smith
and DeLancey, The State Legislatures and Unionimn, 3S MicEC. L. REV. 937 (1940).
10. War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. Arp. § 1501
(Supp. 1944). The Act expired by its terms June 30, 1947. See Note, The Smith-Con-
nally Act, 3 LAW. Gumn REv. 46, 50-1 (July-Aug. 1943).
11. The prohibition on contributions was not germane to the main purpose of the Act,
which purportedly was an emergency measure aimed to prevent strikes in wartime, and
there was little discussion of that issue. The Senate apparently accepted the prohibition
in order to expedite passage of the entire bill, with an understanding that § 9 would be
amended later. 89 CONG. REc. 5721, 6488 (1943).
12. 256 U. S. 232 (1921).
13. CIO-PAC was organized in response to prohibitions on contributions by labor
organizations in the Smith-Connally Act. It was felt that a new organization was needed
to integrate all political activity. Through CIO-PAC, the CIO is believed to have exerted
a major influence on the 1944 Presidential elections. P=mRso;, AmcmxcA LAron Uiozns
36 (1945).
Literature on its activities is voluminous. The most complete description is contained
in G.ER, TnE FiRsT Rouxx (1944). See also, e.g., Fuller, Labor and Polities, 110 Nnw
R, uBLlc 111 (1944); Hillman, Truth About the PAC, 111 Nnw R Ltc 209 (1944) ;
Waldman, Will the CIO Capture the Democratic Party?, Sat. Eve. Post, Aug. 26, 1944,
p. 22.
14. See Letter from the Atty. Gen. to Sen. Moore dated Sept. 23, 1944, Dep't. of
Justice Press Release, Sept. 25, 1944. See also Departmnent of Justice Clears PAC, 4 LAw.
G-rna Rmv. 49 (Sept.-Oct. 1944).
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financing so as to provide for direct political action rather than union contribu-
tions to candidates and parties. 15
Section 304 reaches two areas of political activity hitherto free from Con-
gressional regulation. First, encouraged by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Classic,16 Congress has extended its control of the electoral
process to include primaries, conventions, and caucuses. Second, Congress has
supplemented its ban on "contributions" by adding the crucial term "expendi-
tures."' 7 It is this particular extension of "corrupt practices" legislation which
gives rise to current controversy.18
Since practically all of a labor organization's political activity is financed
directly from its general treasury rather than from the resources of individual
union members, a literal construction of the term "expenditures" would vir-
tually prohibit all political action by unions "in connection with federal elec-
tions."'1 It is possible to interpret the proscription on expenditures to include
15. Funds were collected by CIO-PAC from individual unions before the nominating
conventions. Part of these were spent before July 23, 1944. On that date the remaining
funds were "frozen," and none of them went into the final election campaign. Instead,
CIO-PAC appealed for voluntary contributions--"A Buck for Roosevelt." In addition,
individual unions engaged in such direct political activity as pamphleteering, the purchase
of radio time, publication of voting records of Congressmen, etc. For a full account of
PAC finances see OvRAcxER, PRxSmaID.AL CAMPAIGN FUNDs 55-71 (1946).
16. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The decision narrowed the effect of the Newberry case by
extending federal control of elections to primaries where the latter are an integral part
of the entire election.
17. The Senate Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential and
Senatorial Campaign Expenditures as early as 1944 considered a recommendation to
amend § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act to prohibit expenditures as well as contributions,
but specifically rejected it, saying, "the extension of the prohibition to include expenditures
would tend to limit the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of
assembly as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." See Sax. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 83 (1945). By 1947 the Committee had changed its mind; it was recommended
that "expenditures" be included within the restriction on contributions. See SEN. REP. No.
1, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 39 (1947) and H. Rtp. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.
39,40 (1946).
18. See statement by the late Joseph A. Padway, formerly AFL General Counsel,
that AFL unions "would observe the ban on direct political contributions," but would
violate the ban or% expenditures. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1947, p. 1, col. 6. The CIO also
attacked only the proscription on expenditures, N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1947, p. 17, col. 1,
and, consequently, the court in United States v. Murray, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1948,
p. 24, col. 1, did not pass on the constitutionality of the ban on contributions.
19. The "expenditures" provision also has serious implications for corporations. The
President, in his veto message, pointed out that § 304 "can be interpreted as going far
beyond its apparent objectives, and as interfering with necessary business activities. It
provides no exemption for corporations whose business is the publication of newspapers
or the operation of radio stations. It makes no distinctions between expenditures made
by such corporations for the purpose of influencing the results of an election and other
expenditures made by them in the normal course of this business 'in connection with an
election' ". N.Y. Times, June 21, 1947, p. 2, col. 7. Although Senator Taft attempted
to avoid such an interpretation, 93 CONG. REc. 6436 (June 5, 1947), the Department of
Justice by implication indicated its agreement with the President. N.Y. Herald Tribune,
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only those made from general union funds received by labor organizations in
the form of dues, rather than from funds collected-especially for political pur-
poses in the form of voluntary contributions by union members. But the
term "expenditure" is all-inclusive on its face, and as such seems to include
any disbursement of money for a political purpose, whether direct or in-
direct.21 Thus, a "contribution" may be considered as but one form of "ex-
July 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 3. In addition, the prohibition on "expenditures" may be inter-
preted as placing drastic limitations upon the activity of any political group, such as,
for example, the League of Women Voters, which happens to be corporate in structure.
See ibid., where the attorney for the League notified the organization officials that their
actions were illegal. And what of the corporation which permits its employees to vote on
company time without deducting from their pay? Cf. People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App.
Div. 141, 63 N.Y.S2d 697 (3d Dep't 1946) ; Note, Pay While Voting, 47 Cor. L. REV. 135
(1947).
20. A narrow construction of § 304 opens up a Pandora's Box of troublesome am-
biguities. The indictment in United States v. Murray, supra note 18, charged that the
CIO News, a union newspaper financed by subscribers, had supported a congressional can-
didate. Yet prior to the Murray case Senator Taft had indicated that publication of a union
newspaper would be proscribed if it were supported "by union funds contributed by union
members as dues" but not if it derived its funds from subscribers. 93 Coc. REc. 6436
(1947). Senator Ball had indicated further that expenditures derived from an "earmarked
portion of the dues which the union collects and remits to the newspaper in the form of sub-
scriptions" might be permissible. Id. at 6438. "Earmarking" then, is apparently necessary
in order to attribute newspaper funds directly to the individual union member rather than
to a forbidden source-the union. But what must be done to assure that the funds are
"earmarked"? Senator Taft offered one solution when he suggested that "If they [union
members] are asked to contribute directly to the support of a newspaper or to the sup-
port of a labor political organization, they know what their money is used for and pre-
sumably approve it." Id. at 6440. His further remarks leave unclear whether the union
would be allowed to employ mild coercion such as social stigma, and whether his inter-
pretation requires "contracting in" or "contracting out"; but he has recently indicated
that the aim of § 304 is "to prevent labor organizations from using their members' money
for political campaigns without the membership's complete consent." N.Y. Herald
Tribune Feb. 26, 1948, p. 2, col. 3.
21. Representative Hartley announced that if § 304 failed to e.\'press his view that
no union newspaper, regardless of its method of financing, should be permitted to take
a stand on a political candidate, he would be "willing to amend the act to make it clear."
N.Y. Herald, July 16, 1947, p. 3, col. 2.
Compare the interpretation offered by a New York Herald Tribune reporter,
after an interview with Department of Justice officials concerning limitations on com-
mercial newspapers, that the word "expenditure" "is not the ambiguous term it vas
thought to be during debate over the bill .... Another, and still effective, section of the
original corrupt practices act defines an 'expenditure' broadly as 'anything of value' ...
the expenditure of paper, ink, writing services and composing costs of any newspaper
owned by 'any corporation' or labor union in publishing a political editorial is apparently
a technical violation." N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 3.
It is difficult to find here one clear interpretation. It is suggested that if a narrow
view was intended, it would have been simple to draft legislation specifically creating
separate union political funds and assessments with the power of individual members to
withhold "political dues."
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
penditure." 22 Within the scope of "expenditure" would be included disburse-
ments for publication of union newspapers, magazines, leaflets, and pam-
phlets.23
An even broader range of activities may be affected. Since payment from
union funds of the salary of an organizer who makes political speeches is lit-
erally an expenditure, such activity may be forbidden. Where an umbilical
cord has linked CIO and PAC, any activity by CIO fostering PAC could be
interpreted as an expenditure, and thus prohibited. If "expenditure" is strictly
interpreted, a union hall could not be placed at the disposal of a candidate or
party; anyone who in the union name sought to propagandize for a candidate
or party would do so at the union's peril; handbills and placards would be
barred; paid newspaper and magazine advertisements and radio advertising
would be similarly proscribed. A literal interpretation of "expenditure" thus
bans any conceivable political action by the union in connection with federal
elections.
Since it is the labor union which is concerned, one of a group of problems
may be the definition of "labor organization." The definition in Section 304 is
substantially similar to that of Section 9 of the Smith-Connally Act2 5 and of
22. Sections 302 (d) and 302 (e) of the original Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43
STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241 (1940) define "contribution" and "expenditure" in such
a way as to make differentiation almost impossible. Both expenditures and contributions
ire referred to as gifts, loans, advances, deposits of money or value, and contracts,
promises, or agreements to make them. The only word exclusively characterizing a
"contribution" is "subscription"; the exclusive words for "expenditure" are "payment"
and "distribution". See generally 93 CoNG. REc. 6436 (1947).
23. Senator Taft, in explaining the bill, consistently distinguished as to the source
of the publication's funds. If the newspaper or pamphlet was supported by union or cor-
poration funds, its political activity would be proscribed by the Act; if supported by
subscriptions, political activity would be allowable. See his statements in 93 CoNG, Rw,
6436-7 (1947), and N. Y. Herald Tribune, July 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 3. But compare a pos-
sible additional distinction drawn by Senator Taft between a newspaper which is "a going
concern" and one which is not. 93 CoNG. REc. 6438 (1947).
24. On July 10, 1947, Senators Aiken of Vermont and Hatch of New Mexico intro-
duced into the Senate a bill (S. 1613) to amend the Act to permit political expenditures
by unions. Senator Aiken pointed out that, as far as § 304 was concerned, "it was realized
by some that the bill went too far in restricting freedom of speech and of the press."
N.Y. Times, July 12, 1947, p. 2, col. 3. Remarking on the lack of debate in Congress on
§ 304, Senator Hatch stated that if the section did infringe constitutional guarantees, "the
question should be thoroughly explored here on the floor of the Senate." 20 LAD. Rr.. REP,
187 (1947). Representative McDonough of California introduced a bill (H.R. 4193) which
would permit union papers to express preferences as to political candidates; provided a
majority of the union so voted and with a certificate to this effect filed with the NLRB.
Senator Taft pronounced himself opposed to the Aiken-Hatch Amendment but suggested
that the new House-Senate Labor Committee study the advisability of changing the
"expenditure" restrictions in § 304. Ibid. He later indicated, however, that he was "rigor-
ously opposed" to changing the political expenditures provision before 1949. N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Feb. 26, 1948, p. 2, col. 3.
25. The definition in § 304 reads, "For the purposes of this section 'labor organiza-
tion' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation con-
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the original National Labor Relations Act of 1935.20 When demands were
made in 1943 that the Department of justice prosecute PAC as a labor organi-
zation, it was decided, in-tcr alia, that, despite the CIO's close relationship with
PAC, the latter did not bargain with employers concerning working condi-
tions and so would not be considered a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 9.27 As a result, PAC itself apparently is free to engage in political
activities.28
Another question likely to arise is the meaning of the phrase "in connection
with" federal elections. While it seems to have no authoritative interpretation,
one possible limitation, already observed with respect to the Smith-Connally
Act, would confine its application to the period following the filing date for a
federal candidate or for delegates to a nominating convention or caucusPm
Thus, a general educational campaign discussing political issues, if engaged in
prior to the filing date, wbuld not be forbidden. But an impartial presentation,
after filing date, of the voting records of all candidates would be barred. On
the other hand, the scope of "in connection with" might be extended to any
campaign activity which bore on the status of a candidate or party, especially
where candidacy is known in advance of filing, or where the political position
of a party is generally cognizable.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Congressional regulation of federal elections has been sanctioned on the
basis of those provisions of the Constitution which vest in Congress power to
regulate Presidential and Congressional elections,30 and which have been
mittee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work."
26. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1940).
27. See note 14 supra.
28. Whether such organizations as the AFL Connecticut Federation of Labor would
be included within the § 304 definition may be one of the litigated questions, al-
though it seems fairly clear that both AFL and CIO as national organizations come
within the meaning since they engage in dealing with employers, whereas State Federa-
tions of Labor do not.
29. See Pressman, CIO Memorandum No. 2, Re: Political Acli:'ity tndcr Taft-
Hartley Act (1947).
30. There is little question but that Article I, § 4 grants broad power to Congress
to regulate the manner of holding Congressional elections. United States v. Gradwell,
243 U.S. 476 (1917); cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). When Congress
attempted to extend its control to Presidential elections, it encountered a barrier in that
Article II, § 1, CL 2 specifically vests in the states the power to regulate the man-
ner of appointing Presidential electors. Cf. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377 (1890) ; McPher-
son v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). But in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290
U.S. 534 (1934), where a requirement of publicity in the Corrupt Practices Act of 192.3
concerning elections was contested, the Court sanctioned Congressional regulation of
Presidential election. For a broad picture of Congressional power, consult Maurer, Con-
gressional and State Control of Elections Undcr the Constitution, 16 Gro. L. J. 314, 324-27
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broadly interpreted for the protection of electoral processes from such "cor-
rupt practices" as fraud and vote buying. Where, however, "corrupt prac-
tices" legislation seems seriously to curtail the expression of political opinion,
a grave constitutional issue is presented.31 Inasmuch as Section 304 seems to
provide a blanket prohibition on union political expression, a Supreme Court
which is less insistent on "judicial self-restraint" where political processes are
concerned3 2 undoubtedly will scrutinize the section with great care. The pre-
sumption of validity which normally attaches to legislation tends to disappear
where a statute impinges on freedom of speech, assembly and press as pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 33
(1928). Another possible instrument for controlling election expenses lies in the com-
merce power. See cognate provision of Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
which forbade contributions to federal, state or local political campaigns by any reg-
istered utility holding company or subsidiary. 49 STAT. 823 (1935), 15 U.S.C. 79(1)
(1940).
31. How the Court will interpret the word "expenditure" may be a key to the con-
stitutionality of § 304. The Court may construe the term so loosely as to foreclose
the need for a decision on constitutional grounds. For example, the Court might read into
the meaning of "expenditure" a complex ritual of "contracting in" or "contracting out."
See note 20 mtpra and pp. 820-1 infra.
It is also possible that § 304 is so vague, and Congressional intent so uncertain as to
void this criminal statute under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931). See Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MicM.
L. REv. 831 (1923); Note, 26 Tax. L. Rav. 216 (1947); Note, Indefinite Criteria
of Definiteness in Statutes, 45 HAMv. L. Rxv. 160 (1931). In United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1 (1947), in ruling on the Lea (Anti-Petrillo) Act, the Court held there was a suf-
ficient measure of certainty but seemed to rely heavily on a conclusion that Congress could
not have worded the statute more precisely. Id. at 1541. Such does not seem to be the
case in § 304. Certainly Congressional debate (most ambiguous in the case of § 304),
even if crystal clear, need not be determinative. Mr. Justice Holmes is known to
have pointed out that "when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was in-
discreet enough to say I don't care what their intention was. I only want to know
what the words mean." Letter of Mr. Justice Holmes quoted in Frankfurter, Soine Re-
flections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Co. L. REv. 527, 538 (1947).
If the Court, either by restricting the scope of "expenditure" or by invalidating § 304
for vagueness, does not reach the constitutional issue under the First Amendment, much
of this constitutional analysis may be irrelevant.
32. Perhaps the frankest statement by the Court of its substitution of its own evalua-
tion of a civil liberties situation for that of Congress is Mr. Justice Rutledge's in Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1944). He pointed out that the ". . , judgment in the first
instance is for the legislative body. But in our system where the line can constitutionally
be placed presents a question this Court cannot escape answering independently, whatever
the legislative judgment. . . !' But cf. Colegrove v. Green 328 U.S. 549, 56 YALE L. J. 127
(1946) (refusal to review inequities of Illinois Congressional districting) ; and Cook v.
Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam refusal to rule on constitutionality of Georgia
county electoral system).
33. Mr. Justice Stone's famous footnote gloss in United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938), spelled out for the first time the Court's need for a
"more searching judicial inquiry" where political processes are at stake. One of the
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Political Expenditures and The First An-eidnwnt
Supporters of Section 304 might argue that the statute places no restriction
on freedom of speech since it prohibits only expenditures of money and not
the actual right to speak itself. Such a contention, would ignore the fact that,
even in the 18th Century, the exercise of free speech often involved the ex-
penditure of funds, as for example, in political pamphleteering. It is hardly to
be supposed that the drafters of the Bill of Rights would have countenanced a
restriction on such pamphleteering if couched in the form of a ban on ex-
penditures. Moreover, civil and political rights have become more complex
within the last decades than in our early constitutional days. No longer is
the right to speak encompassed by freedom to mount a cracker-barrel. Instead,
such mass communication media as newspapers, radio and motion pictures now
provide techniques for reaching millions of people so as to make many
traditional concepts of the right of free speech anachronistic.34 Since free
access to channels of communication is the essence of free speech today, and
access is impossible without large expenditures of money, the right to spend
in order to be "free" to speak effectively would seem to be deserving of pro-
tection under the First Amendment.
The need for "effectiveness" of speech was recognized by the draftsmen of
the Constitution itself in protecting the cognate freedom of assembly as a
means of implementing free speech. This need has also been recognized by the
Supreme Court, which has gone far beyond protecting the naked right, to in-
sure the effective right, to free speech. The Court has struck down a wide
range of burdensome restrictions which, while they did not actually forbid free
speech as such, made its exercise within significant contexts impossible 3' By
strongest supporters of a presumption of constitutionality of legislation, Mr. Justice Stone
nevertheless himself sounded a caveat which marked the new Court's change in attitude.
Heavily relied on in Gitlow v. New York, 263 U.S. 652 (1925), and Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), the presumption of constitutionality of statutes regulating
political and dvil rights was given less effect in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), the presumption was said to be balanced
by the "preferred place" given to the freedoms secured by the First Amendment. For a
history of the shift, see Shulman, The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Liberty of Con-
tract and Freedolz of Speech, 41 YmAx L. J. 262 (1931) ; see also Hamilton, The turist's
Art, 31 Coi.. L. REv. 1073 (1931). A significant documentation has been collected in the
following notes: 40 Cot. L. REv. 531 (1940) ; 39 Co. L. Rev. 1237, 1242 (1939) ; 38 Mic=.
L. Rev. 57, 60 (1939). For a more general treatment consult Hamilton and Braden, The
Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 Ygrx L. J. 1319, 1349 (1941) and Lusky,
Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 1 (1942). It must be recognized,
however, that the shift in doctrine has been almost entirely spelled out in cases dealing only
with state legislation although on its face it seems equally to apply to federal enactments.
34. See Cox-'nx oN Frimzos OF THE PaRss, A F=ns AND Rnsro,;smr Panss (1947),
57 YALE L. J. 894 (1948).
35. Religious and political groups may meet in public streets, parks, or on private
property, scatter about or peddle pamphlets, canvass from door to door, play controversial
records, and even create disturbances short of a breach of the peace without fear of sanc-
tion. See Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1933) ;
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restricting expenditures, Section 304 strikes indirectly, but nevertheless effec-
tively, at freedom of speech. The draftsmanship of the Constitution, its
interpretation by the Court, and a realistic appraisal of our society today all
argue eloquently that such a restriction, however indirect, is still a restriction.
It is also arguable on behalf of Section 304 that it restricts only the union's
right to spend, leaving the individual's right to spend intact. This point of
view might assume legal significance if the Court should accept a distinction
between the individual union member's personal expenditure and his expendi-
ture as a member of a labor organization. But the First Amendment speaks in
blanket terms of a prohibition against Congressional regulation of free speech,
press, and assembly in general, without reference to "persons" or "citizens,"
categories which have been known to exclude trade unions and corporations in
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.80 The question as to "whose
right" need not arise, since all rights are protected.
Furthermore, the Court has by necessary inference protected the rights
of unions and other unincorporated associations by protecting the individual
member, as in Thomas v. Collins,37 where the Court struck down a Texas
registration statute designed to curb labor unions, because it infringed Thomas'
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ;
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Bill cf.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
36. The Fourteenth Amendment grants to corporations a curious congeries of rights.
Since the corporation is an artificial, unnatural "person" it is often denied civil rights
granted to natural persons by the due process and privileges and immunities clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)
(state statute depriving life insurance companies of defense based on false statements in
applications unless contributory to death of insured) ; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg,
204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (state statute regulating admission of persons to places of public
entertainment); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514, 527 (1939) (American Civil Liberties
Union, a corporation, has no standing as "citizen"). See Elliott, Smoec Constitutional
Aspects of Corporate Citizenship, 16 GEo. L. J. 55 (1927). Bit cf. Independent Service
Corp. v. Tousant, 56 F. Supp. 75, 78 (1944) (where free speech is involved, the corpora-
tion might be able to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment) ; and Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of press
were upheld as to corporations).
Although a labor organization has not been thought of as a "person," it has been noted
by at least one commentator on the Taft-Hartley Act that "constitutional protections may
surround a labor organization, as a 'citizen'." VAN ARKEL, AN ANALYSIS o TnE LA]on
MANAGEMENTRELATIONS Acr, 1947 69 (1947). This is probably not the case, however,
since the opinions in the cases cited supra state specifically that only natural persons are
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens; cf. United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944) (Sixth Amendment), discussed infra note 39. Apparently, in the Ha guc case
it was the individual union members whose prevailing rights protected the union, which
had no standing.
37. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). The right of individuals of any class or group to assemble
into organizations which take political action is protected as a concomitant of the right
of assemblage in the First Amendment as absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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individual right to freedom of speech, although he spoke as a union organizer.
Although the union's right to free speech was not formally before the Court,
yet the union as a group was effectively protected by Thomas' indihidual
right.A8 It might be claimed, however, that Thomas' individual right was in-
separable from the rights of the union in the Thomas case, whereas in Section
801 there are separable rights-the right of the individual, which is protected,
and the right of the union as a group, which is unprotected. s But the reasons
advanced in refutation of the asserted dichotomy between the right to speak
and the right to make expenditures in the exercise of free speech4° apply equally
to a division, under the First Amendment, between the individual and the
group to which he belongs. Moreover, even though traditional concepts of
freedom have been largely cast in terms of the individual,4 ' it should be re-
called that freedom of assembly is a group freedom. Particularly where few
individuals are in a position to make large expenditures, if free speech is to be
effective, individuals must be allowed to express their views through groups.
42
38. This would seem to be Thomas' right as a union member, not as an offial, on the
theory that the individual member is able to assert his personal right to protect his stake in
group activity.
39. A similar argument was presented by Counsel for Respondent, State of Alabama,
in Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945), vwhere it was claimed that the
penal provisions of § IS of Alabama's Bradford Act, a comprehensive law regulating the
activities of labor organizations in Alabama by means, inter alia, of annual reports, work
permits, and campaign fund restrictions, were directed not against individual members of
the union but only against the organization itself; and that individual rights, therefore,
were not infringed. See Brief for Respondent, 36-9. But the court had no occasion to
discuss this argument since it did not reach the merits of the case. Cf. United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), where the privilege against self-incrimination was held to be
a personal one unavailable either to a union or to the custodian of union records acting in
his official capacity. The distinction, however, between the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the freedom of speech or press seems clear. See Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-7 (1937). Historical and functional analyses indi-
cate that fundamentally different purposes underlie their protection. Whether fostered by
a sentiment which "recoils from forcing another human being" by physical torture or im-
prisonment "to supply by his own act the incriminatory evidence," 8 WNont, EvM=;cE
§ 2259a (2d ed. 1923), or by a desire to compel the prosecution to search for independent
evidence instead of relying on compulsory self-disclosure, United States v. White, msura
at 698, the privilege against self-incrimination is "essentially a personal one, applying only
to natural individuals." Ibid. A union is not an appropriate subject for physical com-
pulsion. Where most of the evidence incriminating such an organization must be found,
if at all, in its records, a search for independent evidence would prove largely futile. Id.
at 700; 8 W GmrOpx, EvimNcE §§ 2259a, 2259bb (2d ed. 1923). See generally, in addition,
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905). On
the other hand, freedom of speech and of press serves to insure dissemination of "the
widest possible information!' essential to democratic political processes. See pp. $24-6
infra. Hence the distinction drawn between individual and group in the matter of self-
incrimination seems scarcely applicable here.
40. See pp. 815-6 pra.
41. "The central theme in our American heritage is the importance of the individual
person.... The welfare of the individual is the final goal of group life." Tnn PFmsr-
DLNu's Commnrrz oN Cvi. RIGHTS, To SscuRE TuEsr RIGHTs 4 (1947).
42. See Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E2d 115
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Political Expenditures and the "Clear and Present Danger" Test
The right to speak and the right to make expenditures for group political
activity, then, are correlative. Yet Congress has sought their curtailment.
Where inroads have been made into an area surrounded by constitutional
"no-trespassing" signs, a critical examination of the justification for such ac-
tion seems in order. The standards which must be met if legislation making
these inroads is to be sustained have been traditionally cast in terms of the
"clear and present danger" test.43 The test provides that the legislature may
not limit freedom of speech nor press merely for the sake of private or public
convenience, but may restrict it only where the state itself is threatened by
such substantive evils as destruction of life or property, breach of peace, or
other violent evils both serious and imminent" The Supreme Court has, how-
ever, been known to ignore the syntax of the test, even in free speech cases
and to discuss simply the reasonableness of the legislation.45
Of many-justifications suggested for restriction of labor union expenditures
perhaps the most consistently urged is that minority members of trade unions
are coerced into financial support of political objectives with which they are
(1946), where the court, striking down a prohibition on union political expenditures,
pointed out that "Individuals seldom impress their views upon the electorate without or-
ganization. They have a right to organize into parties, and even into what are called 'pres-
sure groups,' for the purpose of advancing causes in which they believe. They have a right
to engage in printing and circulating their views, and in advocating their cause in public
assemblies and over the radio. All this costs money, and if all use of money were to be
denied them the result would be to abridge even to the vanishing point any effective free-
dom of speech, liberty of the press, and right of peaceable assembly." Id. at 252, 69
N.E.2d at 130.
43. First formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S.
47, 52 (1919), the test as classically stated protects utterances which do not "create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." These "substantive evils" have never been adequately defined and are
subject to considerable controversy. "Like many other rules for human conduct [the test]
can be applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment...." Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U. S. 466, 482-3 (1920) (dissenting opinion). Although it fell into discard,
the test was revived in a 5-4 decision in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 256 (1937).
The obvious ambiguity of the test as it stands has led to some criticism. See Wechsler, in
Symposium on Civil Liberties, 9 Am. L. ScHOOL R v. 881 (1941). But the Court continues
to use it to strike down legislation. See generally, CHAE, FaE SEEcH IN TUE UNITED
STATES (1941) passim.
44. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-5 (1940).
45. The Court in sustaining legislation, challenged as violative of the First Amend-
ment, ignored the "clear and present danger" test in the following: Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S.
722 (1942) ; Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941) ; Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) ; Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Some
cases have protected freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion without expressly
using the clear and present danger test. See AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; De Jonge
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not in sympathy and as to which they have no freedom of choice,"6 since the
union shop, sanctioned by the Taft-Hartley Act, helps to afford unions control
over the labor market.
47
Although it is recognized that some oligarchically controlled unions do abuse
their economic and political power, it would seem that the union member is
protected where union elections and significant political ex-penditures are
given democratic guarantees. Such guarantees could be secured by legislation
which would protect the democratic processes within the union,48 or which
would require majority consent to political expenditures. 49
It might perhaps be argued that further protection for dissenters would be
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in Congressional recognition of the
union shop, for by sanctioning the union shop Congress has already sanc-
tioned a restraint on the rights of a minority in the furtherance of reasonable
union objectives. 0 Hence the proponents of additional restrictions on union
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ; Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
46. Senator Taft expressed this view in Congressional debate, asldng "Why should
[union members] be forced to contribute money for the election of someone to whose election
they are opposed?" 93 Cong. Rec. 6440 (1947) ; and more recently went so far as to sug-
gest that the aim of § 304 was merely to protect dissenting union members. N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Feb. 26, 1948, p. 2, col. 3. See note 20 sapra. This attitude has also been vigor-
ously articulated by a Boston journalist in Mullins, I Object to M3y Union in Politics,
Readers Digest, Sept. 1944, p. 9, and Waldman, Will the CIO Capture the Democratic
Party, Sat. Eve. Post, Aug. 26, 1944, p. 22. In more sophisticated form this argument is
advanced in Braunthal, American Labor in Politics, 12 SocrAL. R=snc 1, 9 (1945).
Braunthal, a research economist for a union, recommends financing political campaigns by
voluntary contributions of union members as the "only sound democratic" way. See also
Smr. REP. No. 151, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1937).
47. The "closed shop," an even stronger hold on union members, has been barred by
the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (a) (3) (Supp. 1947),
but the "union shop," a less rigorous form of union security arrangement, has been per-
mitted.
48. Democratic government of unions might be assured, for instance, by a require-
ment that there be annual elections of all officers of the union, with appropriate powers
granted these officers to appoint agents, organizers, and representatives. A majority of
union members attending should be sufficient. Thus, union officials whose political policies
are repugnant to the membership can be voted out of office. In addition, a further safe-
guard might be special sessions at which broad political policies would be voted upon.
Such devices would curb oligarchic tendencies in trade unions. See Democracy with a
Union Card in Lzaxza, IDEAs ARE \V.A.'oNs 517-33 (1939) and, generally, Surm.A,
U Io RIGHTS AND UNION Du=IS 20-52 (1943).
49. Since political expenditures by labor groups have formerly been of insignificant
importance, most union constitutions appear to afford few specific safeguards to union
members. As to whether or not union funds generally have been used by officers of labor
organizations in conformity with majority wishes and in accordance with democratic
procedures, see Overacker, Labor's Political Contributions, 54 Po. Sci. Q. 56, 67-8
(1939). A reasonable measure of self-regulation would not hamper union leaders and
would easily furnish required minority protection. But see Bernstein, rohn L. Leuis and
the Voting Behavior of the CIO, 5 Pun. Op. Q. 233 (1941).
50. Nor does this restraint appear to infringe upon dissenters' constitutional preroga-
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control of dissenters are in reality asserting that political activity is not such a
reasonable objective.51 It has been suggested, however, by the district court
opinion in United States v. Murray52 that even narrowly drawn legislation de-
signed to protect the minority member at the expense of the union majority
may be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, British experience has shown that
specific legislation may be drawn, if necessary, to give dissenters this added
protection." Such legislation could take either of two forms: "contracting in,"
in which all members approving of the proposed assessment would be required
to give affirmative evidence of such approval or "contracting out," in which
tives. Cf. DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. App.
1946), 60 H.Rv. L. Ry. 834 (1947), aff'd, 31 Cal. 2d 137 (1947), where an application by
Cecil B. DeMille for reinstatement in his union and in a $98,200 a year job was denied.
Suspended from both for refusal to pay a $1.00 assessment to support the union lobbying
campaign on a labor issue, he had argued that the compulsory assessment infringed his
"constitutional right of suffrage, freedom of speech, press and assembly." The court up-
held his suspension in an opinion pointing out that submission to reasonable obligations
democratically imposed could not be construed to infringe on fundamental individual
rights. The Court, assuming the constitutionaUty of § 9 of the Smith-Connally Act, see p.
808 mspra, indicated that an assessment for political contributions would have been un-
sustainable. Absent a statutory prohibition on expenditures, therefore, it would seem, un-
der the court's rationale, that the individual dissenter to union political expenditures would
not be entitled to protection.
51. If dissidents are to be bound by the union majority in economic decisions even to
the extent that they may be deprived of employment for failure to pay their dues, it might
be argued that similar weight should be accorded political decisions democratically entered
upon, provided these do not transgress the reasonable limits of union activity. Cf. Morgan
v. Local 1150, United Electrical Workers, 16 LAB. REL. REP. 476 (Ill. Super. Ct. 1945)
(individual expelled from union because of disagreement with its political policies had
right to job but not to official union position). For an example of unreasonable political
activity by a union, see Collins v. IATSE, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 244, 182 Atl. 37, 45 (1935)
(disapproving racketeering political contributions to candidates for the Newark City Com-
mission where it was not customary for union to make such contributions). See, generally,
COMMAGER, MAJoRaT RULE AND MINORIT RIGHTs (1943) ; Baldwin, Union Adininistra-
tion and Civil Liberties, 248 ANxALs 54 (1946) ; Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade
Union, 50 YALm L.J. 621 (1941).
Furthermore, it would seem desirable where possible to encourage the diversion of
techniques of economic warfare into political channels. See pp. 826-7 infra.
52. N. Y. Times, March 16, 1948, p. 24, col. 3.
53. The British experiment, abandoned recently by the Labor Government, had its
genesis in a set of circumstances similar to present ones in the United States and-perhaps
typically-several decades earlier. Labor's successful and ever-developing participation in
English politics caused Conservatives much concern. At length, in 1910, suit was brought to
enjoin a leading union from making political contributions to the Labor Party. Previous
litigation had resulted in a decision legitimizing labor's political contributions, Steel v.
South Wales Miners' Federation, [1907] 1 KB. 361, but after extensive and bitter litiga-
tion the House of Lords, in Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910]
A.C. 87, decided that the making of contributions to Labor M.P.'s was not one of the
"legitimate objectives" of trade unionism, and that compulsory levies were idira vires.
"Expenditures" were not affected.
The labor movement reacted to the Osborne decision with a wave of strikes. After
some partial appeasements, a compromise was reached three years later which relieved
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the dissident union member would be required to indicate his non-assent to a
proposed political assessment. Where it is possible to confine remedial legisla-
tion to the specific evil, it seems clear that so broadly repressive a measure as
Section 304 reaches needlessly into labor's allowable area of political activity.P
Another argument bases the validity of Section 304; upon the dangers from
the influence of money in elections.m5 But no real danger to our democratic
form of government has been demonstrated in labor's political expenditures0 0
trade unions of the ultra vires restriction. Political contributions were permitted subject
to majority decisions by rank and file members, with exemptions for those members who
did not wish to contribute but who could, by affirmative action, "contract out" of a political
assessment. Following the disastrous 1926 General Strike, however, the Conservatives
passed new legislation which amended the requirements so that members were required
affirmatively to "contract in" by signifying a positive desire to contribute, even though a
majority of members had approved the contribution. Thus, the burden of overcoming
inertia was placed upon the union rather than upon the individual. Shortly after the
Labor Party came to power in 1945, all limitations were repealed. It must be noted that
at no time were union newspapers affected, a motion to include them in legislation having
been rejected by the House of Commons as an undue limitation on union political power.
Other "expenditures" were similarly protected at all times. See Rothschild, Government
Regulation of Trade Unions in Great Britain: II, 38 CoL L. Rnv. 1335, 1353 et scq.
(1938). See also NVEBB, THE HISToRY OF TRADz UmoNmsM 603 et seq. (1920) ; 3 COLX,
A SHORT HisToRY OF THE BarrIsH WOP I G CLASS MOVEMENT 54-61 (2d ed. 1937).
For a brief discussion of the Trade Disputes Act of 1927 see Mason, British Trade Dis-
putes Act of 1927, 22 A.m. PoL. SCL REv. 143 (1928). See also Pease, Trade Unions and
Trade Disputes in English Law, 12 CoL.. L. REv. 589, 595 (1912).
54. "The attempt to correct abuses of freedom ... by resort to legal penalties and
controls is the first spontaneous impulse of reform. But the dangers of the cure must be
weighed against the dangers of the disease... ." THE ComMz'z o.- FimmoorOF THE
Pzss, A F=nn AND RF-sioNsmrx PREss 122 (1947).
A familiar criticism by the Court in civil liberties cases is that legislation is of too
sweeping a character. Thus, in Schneider v. State, 303 U.S. 147, 162 (1939), the Court
said, "This constitutional protection does not deprive a city of all powers to prevent street
littering. There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is punishment
of those who actually throw papers on the streets." In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353,
364-5 (1937), the Court struck down the application of a criminal syndicalism law, saying,
"The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against... abuse [of in-
citement to violence and crime]. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional
justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed."
See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 308 (1940) ; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 (1940) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 451 (1938). See Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 COL. L.
Rsv. 595, 607 (1947) ; Note, 5 U. OF CHr. L. Rnv. 675, 677 (1938).
55. Note Senator Bankhead's statement, in introducing an amendment to Hatch Act
H, "We know that money is the chief source of corruption," quoted in OvanAcrmn, Pr asx-
DENTAL CAMPAIGN FuNDs 27 (1946), and see pp. 807-3 supra. But see Clark, Federal
Regulation of Election Campaign Activities, 6 FED. B. J. 5, 8 (1944) ". . . Congress has
always recognized that expenditure of money in elections is not in itself evil......).
56. Much public attention wmas called to the threat of A. F. Whitney, President of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, that his union would spend forty-seven million dollars to
defeat President Truman for re-election in 1948, and two and a half million dollars to
defeat any Congressman who voted for restrictive labor legislation. N.Y. Times, May 27,
1946. v. 1. col. 6.
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On the contrary, by promoting interest in the electoral process, labor seems to
be enlarging democratic methods.5 7 Even if there were abuses inherent in
labor's political activities, it would seem more appropriate for Congress to take
steps which meet the specific evils. If, for example, it is feared that spending
by labor leads to corruption, then a federal statute directly affecting such prac-
tices could be enacted, rather than broadly prohibitive legislation which affects
basic freedoms.5 8 Not until specific prohibitions are found inadequate should
Congress legislate in any broader manner.
Further argument in support of the legislation might be grounded upon the
proposition that democracy is subverted where powerful groups are permitted
to erect a political influence out of proportion to their numbers, But even if
Congress could restrict free speech in order to strike at such an evil, there
is little evidence that labor organizations exercise a disproportionate influence
on the electoral processY9 The relatively insignificant role of labor is reflected
in recent presidential elections where organized labor contributed but 4% to
7% of all campaign funds;6° yet this percentage represents the contributions
57. For a comprehensive picture of labor's political activity consult CARROLL, LABOR
AND POLmTcs (1923) ; H. L. CHILDS, LABOR AND CAPITAL iN NATIONAL POLuTICS (1930) ;
LoxwiN, THE AmERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (1933); PERLMAN, A THEORY OF TnE
LABOR MOVEMENT (1928); SCHNEIDER, WORKERS' (COMMUNIST) PARTY AND AmERIcAx
TRADE UNIoNs (1928); Barbash, Unions, Government and Politics, 1 INDUST. AND LA.
REL. REv. 66 (1947); Frey, Labor in Politics, 39 AMER. FEDERATIONIST 1012 (1932);
Rosenfarb, Labor's Role in the Election, 8 PuB. Op. Q. 376 (1944); Rovere, Labor's
Political Machine, 190 HARPER's 592 (1945); Seidman, Organiaed Labor in Political
Campaigns, 3 PUB. Op. Q. 646 (1939) ; Taft, Labor's Changing Political Line, 45 J. Pol.
EcoN. 634 (1937).
58. Congress, for example, may provide punishment for election officials for neglect
of duty or for fraud, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) ; Ex parie Clarke, 100 U.S.
399 (1879) ; In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888) ; candidates may be required to file sworn
statements of campaign expenses, United States v. Cameron, 282 Fed. 684 (D. Ariz.
1922) ; Congress may punish for perjury in inquiries before it as to campaign expendi-
tures of senatorial candidates, United States v. Seymour, 50 F.2d 930 (D. Neb. 1941).
59. Labor's expenditures in national campaigns before 1936 were small and sporadic.
In that period the AFL expended a bare $100,000 for political purposes from general
treasury funds, and made no contributions to candidates or parties whatsoever. But in
the 1936 election contributions from labor unions assumed new significance. And CIO
unions, including the expenditures by their own political organizations and contributions
to the Democratic Party, spent almost three quarters of a million dollars in the 1936
campaign. The percentage contributed by labor, however, was still small. For a ready
compilation of data, see Overacker, Labor's Political Contributions, 54 Pot.. Sci. Q. 56
(1939). It should be understood that labor's "expenditures" cannot be computed as easily
as "contributions," since political expenditures are often intangible and are inextricably
woven with other non-political expenditures; labor's total political activity is undoubtedly
greater than indicated by figures on sums actually contributed to party funds.
60. In the 1944 election, unions could not contribute qua unions, The CIO-PAC,
however, spent nearly a half million dollars of union funds for education and pre-campaign
publicity and collected another half million for the campaign itself. But the total of all
contributions to the campaign was estimated at nearly $21,000,000. See Overacker, Presi-
dential Campaign Finids, 1944, 39 Am. PoL Sc. Rxv. 899, 906, 921 (1945). Organized
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of fourteen million union workers.0 ' There is also considerable evidence that
other groups enjoy a peculiarly advantageous monopoly in the opinion indus-
tries in that the press, radio, and motion picture industry represent and articu-
late the point of view of their ovners, managers and advertisers.02 And there
is reason to believe that this control has been used so as to discriminate against
labor's participation in the opinion-influencing process.03 Labor's political in-
fluence in proportion to its numbers does not seem "unreasonable," and cer-
tainly does not present a "clear and present danger" to the electoral process.
labor had contributed 5.1% of the funds of the Democratic National Committee in 1936,
and 62% in 1940, and little, if any, to other parties. Overacker, Campai9n Finance in
the Presidential Election of 1940, 35 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 701, 715 (1941).
61. PmmsoN, AmERIcAN LAwoR UNIONS 33-4 (1945).
62. Hays, Civic Discussion Over the Air, 213 ANNALS 37, 44 (1941); Az.aG.,
FRom CHAOS TO CONTROL 4 (1932); Freedom in the Opinion Industries in Luiumn, Im-As
Ana WEAONS 13-24 (1939), and The Barons of Opinion in Lmann, IT xs LATmn TmAI;
You THiNx 127-134 (1943); LAsswEa, DEmocAcy TnnoUGH PUDuc OenWnoN (1941).
There are large combinations within each of the three major opinion industries (press,
radio, films) and important groups are active in two or more of these. The Luce group
controls four magazines and a motion picture company. The Cowles brothers own four
newspapers, four radio stations and a weekly picture magazine. Marshall Field runs one
metropolitan newspaper, four radio stations, a farm journal, and a Sunday supplement
used by more than forty newspapers. Hearst at one time controlled twenty-si: news-
papers, thirteen magazines, eight radio stations, a newsreel company, an interest in a
motion picture feature producing company, a lending feature syndicate, and one of three
press associations. CommIssioN oN FREmmom OF THE PRESS, A Fon A iD Rnsro:¢suzr
PRESS 44-46 (1947). For data on the labor press see 1 RLYxOLs AND Y =.GSV0.=,
TFAin UNION PunLicATioirs c.1 (1944).
63. For discussion of discrimination in the press, see Keezer, 12 Ei.cyc. Soc. Scx.
325, 338-41; Martin, Freedom of the Press, 9 PoL Q. 373 (1938) ; ANGELL, WHY Fnvi-
Dom MATTS 123-4 (1940); Whitney, Labor Gets No Breah in the Prcs, and Bliven,
Balance Sheet for A-merican "ournalism in IcEms, FRaou OF THE PRESS TODAY (1941).
For discussion of discrimination in radio see Si mA.Nn, R.'Aio's SECOND Cmu.ce
104 et seq. (1947); Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57 YMx L. J.
275 (1947); Sussman, How Radio Treated Labor in the Elctions, 14 CoMnAo,: SENsE
34 (1945); Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, 14 Co.inoi; S=.sE
32 (1945); CHASE, SOUND AND FURY 128-9 (1942). See also Broadcasting, Jan.
20, 1947, p. 13, col 1. Consult also Elsten, Mass Communication and American Dc-
mocracy in PRINT, RADIO AND FILM IN A DE.ocRAcy, esp. p. 10 (Waples ed. 1942);
FaosT, Is AmERCAN RADIo DEImocATic? (1937); Kerwin, The Control of Radio,
PuBLIc POLicy PAinPHLET No. 10 (1934); Friedrich, The FCC 'Monopoly" Report: A
Critical Appraisal, 4 Pun. Op. Q. 526 (1940). SiEpm=AIN, RADIo's SECOND CHANc 104
et seq. (1947) notes the discrimination against labor groups, especially during election
periods. Prior to the petition filed before the FCC by the CIO in 1943, requesting that the
license of WHKC be denied renewal, broadcasters generally refused to sell time for any
union programs on the ground that these programs were "almost always of a controversial
nature." But where a business concern sponsored a program, discussion of such sub-
jects as rationing, price control, taxation, international affairs, or labor problems became
non-controversial per se. Perhaps this is because the function of radio, as expressed by
a network president is "selling time for one specific reason, and that is to sell gcods
manufactured by American manufacturers, to the public." See Durr, Freedom of Speech
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Political Expenditures and Federal Eiectiows
However justified legislation curbing political contributions may be in the
light of Congressional responsibility for federal elections,04 it seems clear that
equal justification does not exist for a broader prohibition on expenditures0 6
In fact, it may be urged that political expenditures in a democratic society
serve to implement rather than to obstruct the electoral process.
If rational political decisions are to be made, the electorate must have access
to factual information and conflicting opinions from all groups, 0 In Holmes'
classic metaphor, the truth can be discovered only in a free market place of
ideas.67 The First Amendment, in guaranteeing freedom of speech, assembly,
and press,68 supports "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources."('0 But the furnishing of information and
opinion is no longer the inexpensive undertaking that it was in Thomas Jeffer-
son's day, when even the candidate himself is reputed to have expended but
fifty dollars in his Presidential campaign. 7° With the advent of new tech-
for Whom? 8 PuB. Or. Q. 391, 399 (1944). The NAB Code Manual warns that "[em-
ployers] . . . are inclined to frown on those stations, especially in smaller communities,
which open their facilities to labor unions." Id. at 400. See also Note, The Freedom of
Radio Speech, 46 HAgv. L. REv. 987 (1933).
64. See note 8 and pp. 813-4 supra. Cf. United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947), 47 COL. L. REv. 295 (1947); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330
U.S. 127 (1947) (Hatch Act restrictions on political activity of state and federal em-
ployees are constitutional). It has been suggested, however, with respect to political con-
tributions, that "free and prompt publicity" of the source of the contributions is more
desirable than their prohibition. SEN. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1945).
65. In United States v. Murray, N.Y. Times, 'March 16, 1948, p. 24, col. 5, the Mitchell
case, note 64 supra, was distinguished on two grounds: that restrictions on the political
activity of federal employees were justified, not on the basis of Congressional power to
regulate elections, but on the right of government to prescribe rules of conduct for its
own employees; and that regulation of political activities is not equivalent to a prohibi-
tion of political expenditures since the latter, as applied to labor organizations, "absolutely"
forecloses any action in connection with elections.
66. "If then we desire to keep the freedom we have had and the humane spirit of
our civilization, it is necessary for us to know our theory and practice of popular govern-
ment, and to equip ourselves with information and understanding for the purpose of
upholding it, developing it, and making it more effective. .. ." BE~aR, AMERIcAN Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS 2 (1939). See also KaY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 488; Riesman,
Education for Democracy, 5 PuB. Op. Q. 195 (1941).
Where the information is "bad"--that is, where political propaganda is defamatory,
specific measures can curb such an abuse. See BONE, SMEAR POLITICS (1941), which
presents evidence that an increasing amount of political propaganda refers to general
political issues in a defamatory manner. Suggestions for control of this type of abuse
are outlined in Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 CoL. L. REv. 595
(1947).
67. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
68. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("The liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.")
69. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
70. MERRAM AND GosNELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 361.
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niques and channels of communication, 71 political costs have risen steeply. 2
In addition to population increases, new areas have been developed and basic
services have risen in price. Large scale printing, direct mail distribution,
newspaper advertisements, billboards, auditorium space, radio broadcasting
time, and motion pictures,--all have added to the expense of publicizing diver-
gent viewpoints on political issues.73 To the extent that political expenditures
are curtailed, the education of the American electorate will suffer.
If government is to remain responsive to the needs of all groups in the pop-
ulation,74 these groups must be able to influence the decision-making pracess.7
The union has of late concerned itself with the wage-earners' stake in such
vital legislative issues as taxation, housing, rent and price control, full em-
ployment, minimum wages, health, education, and the elimination of dis-
crimination in employment. Recent years have witnessed a growing participa-
tion by union officials in political life, in administration affairs as well as in the
71. q . we have allowed our ideas about these rights [of speech and press] to
remain static while the facts about them have greatly changed. ... Public opinion now
is formed by many devices other than assembly or speech or the press ... new phases
of life have taken their place. Radio broadcasts, syndicated columnists, newsreels, public
relations counsel, news weeklies, press bureaus . .. and many other devices now tell us
many things ... the tools of propaganda and the techniques available for making ekec-
tive use of them have been modernized." Cherington, Our Frecdom= and Our Otinibor,
6 PUB. Op. Q. 616 (1942).
72. While figures for total expenditures "in connection with elections" are naturally
unavailable, expenditures out of contributions to political parties have risen from almost
$4,500,000 in 1916 to almost $21,000,000 in 1944. From 1912 to 192 costs per vote
fluctuated between 15 and 20 cents, but in the last three Presidential elections for which
figures are available the cost per vote has risen to 32 cents. See Omticnu, Mozn n;
EL rios 75-6 (1932); Overacker, Campaign Funds in a Depression Ycar, 27 Am.
PoL. Sc. REv. 769, 771 (1933) ; Overacker, Campaign Funds in the Prcsidential Elction
of 1936, 31 Am. PoL. SC. RFv. 473, 477 (1937).
Contributions to political campaigns furnish a rough index of the increasing cost
of influencing public opinion. It would appear, therefore, that groups who wish to in-
fluence public opinion outside of the political party must themselves spend more to mal:e
themselves heard.
73. See LoGAx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 188-94.
74. Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 Pumic PoLicy 83 (Fried-
rich and Mason eds. 1942), has pointed out that "The concept which sees the problem
of political power raised only by tension between 'the individual' and 'the state' fails to
recognize that political power is not a monopoly of the state and that the enjoyment of
civil liberties depends upon one's group affiliations and hostilities.... Only an approach
tinctured with pluralism can do justice to the variety of situations in which problems of
civil-liberty character present themselves; in trade unions, corporations, universities,
professional associations, and so forth." For a literature on pluralism, see Hsmo, PoLTI-
cAL PLURAL= (1927); FIGGIS, Szuszms oF PoLsrrcAL THOUGXUT FEeo Gtnso:s: To
Gaorrus (1907) ; LAsKI, A GRAmmAn oF PoLrrxcs (192) ; Coker, The Technique of the
Pluralistic State, 15 Amx. PoL. ScL REv. 186 (1921); Ellis, The Pluralistic State, 14 Am.
Poi. ScL RErv. 393 (1920) ; Sabine, Phralimn: A Point of Vicw, 17 Az. PoL. Scr. RLv. 34
(1923).
75. See MoscA, TnE RULING CLAss esp. c. 5, (1939). And see LAssvimu, op. cit.
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formulation of legislation.76 This sharing in political activity has correspond-
ingly afforded individual wage earners an opportunity to "participate in mak-
ing the decisions that vitally affect them in their work and community life."77
By curtailing union political expenditures, Congress moves toward the isola-
tion of representative government from the wage earner point of view. To the
extent that the strictures of Section 304 decrease the capacity of one or more
groups to participate in the political process, 78 to that extent groups and ideas
already in power can more easily perpetuate themselves.70 A representative
government must represent more than itself.
CONCLUSION
Both courts and legislature have recognized a clear public interest in the
efficient functioning of such groups as labor organizations. For many labor
unions political activity has become a necessary method of complementing
economic action with favorable legislation."0 There is a powerful incentive for
supra note 62, c. 10 (1941) ; Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy
52 YALE L. J. 203, 226-7 (1943).
76. In addition to the fact that both AFL and CIO have representatives serving as
Assistant Secretaries of Labor, numerous labor leaders have served in many governmental
capacities. Sidney Hillman served in several influential governmental positions, including
that of Associate Director of OPM. Many labor leaders were represented on the War
Labor Board. Representatives of labor appear regularly before Congressional Com-
mittees. See Witmer and Lund, Labor-Work Plus Ideals, 7 PuD. Op. Q. 378, 386, 388
(1943).
77. GoLDEN AND RUTTENBERO, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCnAcY 3 (1942).
78. The effect of § 304 on other groups is not within the scope of this discussion.
See p. 807 supra.
Should § 304 apply unequally in its effects on unions and on corporations, even though
both are nominally included in the Act, it might be argued that it infringes the Fifth
Amendment. Cf. United States v. Murray, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1948, p. 24, col. 1,
where the argument was raised but not passed upon. Although the Fifth Amendment
contains no equivalent of the "equal protection" clause in the Fourteenth Amendment,
Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943), it has been construed to restrain
"such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). See also Currin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939). But cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); NLRB
v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937).
79. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes perhaps articulated, in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365 (1937), the basic premise of the First Amendment: ". . . to maintain the op-
portunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional govern-
ment." Accordingly, the need seems clear to keep open to all groups "the remedial
channels of the democratic process," Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 599 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.), although use of these channels may not "always be
agreeable to those in authority or . . .wise, temperate or useful to society." Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring opinion).
80. "Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation
is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free to turn its publicity on any
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unions to divert techniques of economic warfare into political channels where
it is possible to do so, to the inestimable advantage of a sensitive economy
easily thrown into disequilibrium by industrial strife. And it has been recog-
nized that the individual worker gains equality of economic power with man-
agement only through his labor organization, through which it is possible for
him to do in combination with others what he cannot do singly.8 '
Where a political relationship parallels the employer-employee relationship,
group association seems equally necessary if the union member as an individual
is not to find the task of opposing powerful pressure groups an unequal one.
Unless he may associate himself with others in molding public opinion, his
voice may not be heard in the electoral process. Unless the association may
undertake political expenditures, it cannot utilize the channels of communica-
tion through which public opinion is formed.
The prohibition on political expenditures, then, does not seem justifiable
in terms of any furtherance of democratic electoral processes. Accordingly,
Section 304 would seem to fall within the ban of the First Amendment for-
bidding abridgement by Congress of freedom of expression through free
association.
labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working
conditions." Mr. Justice Jackson, in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547 (1945) (con-
curring opinion).
The late Sidney Hillman indicated that the CIO secured many of its aims by "polit-
ical action!' as well as economic action. Barbash, Unions, Goorr.ert ord Poliq, 1
INusT. AxD LAOR Rm. REV. 66, 68, 69 (1947).
81. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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